Viceroy Research’s Truecaller Bet Signals a New Era for Swedish Tech

SvD Näringsliv

This analysis was first published in SvD Näringsliv, in Swedish, on October 3rd, 2022. This piece was translated from Swedish by Claude. Some phrasing may differ from a human translation.

Viceroy Research’s short bet against Truecaller signals a new era for Swedish tech companies. Financial actors actively looking for opportunities to sink them is the kind of challenge many newcomers have never faced.

A lot can happen in 18 months.

During the spring and summer of 2021 sentiment was still hot and IPOs followed one another in quick succession. Barely a year and a half later we are in the diametrically opposite position. Tech companies have crashed all over the world — in many cases losing well over 50 percent in value.

Now comes the next blow.

Short sellers have started taking positions in Swedish tech companies and are pushing their agenda as activists to drive them down further. When momentum has turned, it is easier than ever to push the price of individual companies lower.

The latest example came last week, when Viceroy Research announced that they had taken a short position in app company Truecaller. On Twitter they described the company as follows:

“Truecaller is a Swedish ad and spyware app powered by a public phonebook that purports to prevent spam (not a joke).”

Not mincing words. In a 29-page document, Viceroy Research goes through what they argue is Truecaller’s breach of GDPR and a long list of other objections. Truecaller has responded to the claims and called them “incorrect and false”.

Frequent readers of the business press may recognise the name Viceroy Research. It is the same firm that last winter accused Ilija Batljan’s real estate company SBB of being “uninvestable”. This has led to a long-running conflict that has probably consumed a great deal of time and energy from both sides. In SBB’s case too, the criticism came at a point when the share price had started to move downward, and it has fallen sharply since.

Tech company Sinch ran into something similar this summer. The firm Ningi Research shorted them while accusing their financial reporting of being misleading by billions. Sinch shortly afterwards changed the way they report, and dismissed their CEO.

Shorting, as is well known, means speculating on falling share prices, something that is hard to do when stocks only go up. As long as the market valued growth highly, plenty of companies had a strong share price regardless of what their fundamentals looked like. Now that the market has turned, earlier lofty valuations add extra fuel for the short sellers.

In several cases it has been enough for them to argue that the company is overvalued. When they then make their case public, it has been an effective way to accelerate the move downward. Something both Truecaller and Sinch have now experienced.

The events show a new kind of challenge and phase for listed tech companies. The fall from the record levels of recent years is high — and there is money to be made on it.

For newly listed companies — or for retail investors following tech companies — a set of situations has emerged that we have not seen in many years in the tech world. When the Japanese super-fund SoftBank previously invested in companies, the world’s eyes turned to them. It was seen as a stamp of strength, and often came with high valuations. SoftBank was the investor that set Klarna’s highest valuation to date at $46 billion.

Now the situation is suddenly reversed. When SoftBank recently announced they had sold their stake in Sinch — Sinch’s share price went up instead. The market treated SoftBank as a risk rather than the mark of quality you might have got 18 months earlier.

The challenges are many for tech companies on the stock market right now. The market’s wish for growth has been swapped out for profitability. Share prices are under pressure and have fallen sharply, which makes staff option programmes worthless. And on top of that now come short sellers who profit from pushing this down further. Newcomers on the stock market look set for a rough ride ahead.

Why Gaming Companies Keep Getting Bought Up

SvD Näringsliv

This analysis was first published in SvD Näringsliv, in Swedish, on September 26th, 2022. This piece was translated from Swedish by Claude. Some phrasing may differ from a human translation.

Billion-dollar deals in the games industry keep coming as the giants fight over the next big shift — games via subscription.

“These days every little game studio has an investment bank working for them.”

Christoph Hartmann, head of Amazon’s games division, sums up the state of the games industry in a simple way.

“I’ve been doing this for 25 years, and the number of game companies I’ve seen compared to what’s left today… […] Who is even still around?”

The question is entirely fair. The games market is in the middle of an enormous consolidation wave that is not yet over. Hence the need for bankers at game studios. There are lots of people calling to see if they want to become part of something bigger.

Just look at these deals from this year alone:

Swedish Embracer has so far made 17 acquisitions — just since February. Looking at the whole market, in the first six months of the year a total of 651 gaming deals worth $107 billion were struck — which is 25 percent more than all the deals in the whole of 2021. Consolidation is accelerating. But why?

There are three plausible reasons.

The first is how Covid affected the games industry at large. More time at home and limited opportunities for other activities benefited gaming companies enormously. Tailwinds in revenue gave game publishers the confidence to spend more on new projects — and to buy each other up. Add historically low interest rates for a long time and you have both cheap financing and unusually strong revenue. It became easy to go big on games — even for players that have traditionally not been particularly active there, such as Amazon.

Interest rates are now rising, but the trend appears to be holding, if you believe the analysts. “We are absolutely not in the final phase of this yet,” says Serkan Toto of analyst firm Kantan Games.

The second reason may be a shifted strategy around risk in game development. Embracer CEO Lars Wingefors described it like this to the Financial Times:

“If you make one game, you have a big business risk. But if you make 200 games, like we do, the business risk is smaller.”

Games — like TV series and films — are heading toward becoming ever more expensive and taking longer to produce. Quality expectations have risen sharply. But like other media, the risk is therefore also high. You can test your way to a certain point, but even a large investment is no guarantee that a game will be a hit. A single game studio can live and die with a single project — and perhaps work for several years on something that is never even released.

Embracer, the best example of a company pursuing this strategy, is betting that the sheer volume of titles released will guarantee a stability that individual studios struggle to create. But for that to work, you have to buy a lot of them. Which they have done.

The third, and probably most important, reason is a change in the business model for games. Big players like Microsoft and Sony are both betting heavily on games via subscription through services like Xbox Live Pass and PlayStation Plus. Even Apple — which has primarily been a platform for other people’s games — has had success with its subscription product, Arcade.

The subscription services have been around for a while but have become a major strategic focus in recent years. It is a big shift from buying games at a single price (common on console or PC) or buying smaller upgrades inside games (common for mobile games). Games often have to be designed differently to work in this new context. On top of that, you continuously need new games to motivate players to keep their subscription.

Like Netflix or HBO — who wants to pay for them if new series and films never come? And one way to guarantee a steady supply of new games is to own your own game studios.

It is not the first time the games industry has come together and grown bigger. Large companies like Electronic Arts and Japanese Square Enix reached their strong positions partly through acquisitions. But shifting your business model at the same time as you try to keep order among many new colleagues around the world — that is a new kind of challenge for the games industry.

TikTok’s Silence Speaks Volumes

SvD Näringsliv

This analysis was first published in SvD Näringsliv, in Swedish, on September 23rd, 2022. This piece was translated from Swedish by Claude. Some phrasing may differ from a human translation.

TikTok dominates youth culture in the West, but when critical questions come up, they put a lid on it.

Who actually calls the shots at the world’s most popular app right now?

The question is being widely debated around the world, but a blog post by Swedish Marika Tedroff, a former employee on TikTok’s policy team, offers some insight. By her third week on the job she was writing global policies — that is, the rules dictating which content is published and prioritised — that affected a billion people.

In an interview with the newsletter Platformer, she describes how decisions were made lightly and quickly.

“I never got the impression that they [TikTok] had bad intentions, but rather a lack of awareness. […] I think the company’s hierarchical culture influenced these kinds of decisions; finishing the task was more important than doing it properly.”

Tedroff stresses in the interview that her experience at TikTok was mixed — she describes the company as both a fantastic place to work and toxic at the same time. A picture confirmed by others SvD has spoken with.

Keeping order among a billion users, while understanding how content is viewed in different cultures, is a complex task to say the least. And with low transparency both inside the company and toward the outside world, plenty of question marks remain about how decision-making at TikTok actually happens.

In connection with the Pontus Rasmusson investigation, SvD has contacted the company several times without receiving a reply. It is probably easier for TikTok to stay silent than to explain how they view Pontus Rasmusson’s posts, with their repeated sexual references, or the fact that he let young users call premium-rate numbers during a live broadcast on the app.

When SvD investigated TikTok last autumn with a focus on how the app handled issues around eating disorders, it also took a long time before a written answer came. Just before Christmas last year, TikTok announced that they had problems with the algorithm serving the same content and that it could be problematic if it concerned things like “extreme dieting”.

In light of the above, the interview with Marika Tedroff is interesting. She describes a complex internal process preceding decisions about TikTok’s rules. According to her, it involves legal, PR, lobbying, child safety and advice from outside experts. And she is clear that their work made a difference.

Fair enough. But without transparency about how these rules are followed, it is hard to judge what responsibility the platform actually takes for its content.

Several heavyweight names internationally are now taking a similar line.

Mathias Döpfner, CEO of media group Axel Springer, said in a conference speech that “TikTok should be banned in all democracies”. He accused Western governments of being “naive and dangerous” for allowing the app to operate in their countries. In the follow-up interview, Döpfner went a step further and called the app “a tool for espionage” for the Chinese regime.

One important dimension is that TikTok is only a product for Western markets. The domestic predecessor Douyin (which is also very popular, but in China) has entirely different rules and regulations. This despite the fact that the parent company, ByteDance, is the same. For Douyin the entertainment profile has been toned down considerably, and the company now says it is on its way to becoming more of a “lifestyle app” instead. That Chinese tech companies have shifted strategy in response to input from Beijing is something we have seen many times before.

The question the West should now be asking is how to relate to the power and influence the big tech platforms have. A billion people in a single app means many minutes spent every day. And even if the app is not explicitly engaged in outright spying, influence can still happen through the content that is presented. Former employees at parent company ByteDance have claimed they gave more visibility to pro-China news in another of the company’s apps. That this happens on TikTok can therefore not be ruled out.

Given all this, you can understand why TikTok does not want to respond when SvD gets in touch. The silence is telling. Do the Swedish spokespeople even know themselves how everything works?

But as long as the users keep coming back, the criticism is a lesser problem for TikTok. For the rest of us, the problem risks becoming all the greater.

Instabox and Budbee Merge as Venture Capital Demands Profitability

SvD Näringsliv

This analysis was first published in SvD Näringsliv, in Swedish, on September 19th, 2022. This piece was translated from Swedish by Claude. Some phrasing may differ from a human translation.

When Instabox and Budbee merge, a new delivery giant is born. Behind the merger sits a bigger trend: venture capital owners think it is time for the companies to get big — so they can become profitable.

This summer the American magazine The Atlantic ran a piece on how the subsidies for the millennial lifestyle were over. After years of cheap taxi rides, food deliveries and parcel couriers, reality had finally caught up. It was time to pay what it actually cost to deliver all these services — and it turned out to be pretty expensive.

That is the same reality now catching up with both Swedish startups and consumers. For many years, historically low interest rates led to over-enthusiasm among investors around growth and high risk. Startups could — and were encouraged to — burn money to win market share. The idea was that new habits would be established with consumers, economies of scale would emerge and then the market would normalise (read: price hikes and less competition).

This is the light in which to view the big deal where delivery companies Budbee and Instabox are merging. Combined valuation: SEK 18 billion. Delivering parcels is profitable. Or rather — delivering parcels is going to be profitable. The companies together lost around SEK 190 million last year on combined revenue of just over SEK 1.3 billion.

Increasing scale is a central part of the deal. Both companies work in freight and deliveries and reasonably have many similarities in their organisations. To SvD, the company’s new CEO Fredrik Hamilton plays down cost synergies and says it is too early to say. It is an understandable comment, but it would be close to unreasonable to assume the merger will not lead to savings.

The elephant in the room is called PostNord.

But cost cuts alone are not what makes scale important. A larger company has an easier time negotiating with business partners and can expand faster internationally. The aforementioned economies of scale mainly appear at very large scale, and it is cheaper to reach that together than as separate companies. In some categories, the business is impossible to run profitably without being a giant.

An additional advantage is that the two companies no longer have to compete with each other and can instead focus on the other players in the market. The elephant in the room is called PostNord — by far the biggest on the Swedish market. Another is competitor Airmee, which has Amazon as a major customer.

The deal between Instabox and Budbee is conditional on approval from the Swedish Competition Authority. A safe bet is that the deal goes through. You only have to look at the American market to see where the big threats are coming from — as early as 2020, Amazon’s own shipping arm became bigger than FedEx in terms of volume. Having large domestic players that can take on global giants could, if anything, be seen as positive for competition.

Venture capital has been paying your tab for many years.

As a consumer you may sometimes wonder how certain services can even add up. Some things have been unreasonably cheap for a very long time. You don’t have to look further than the pavement and all the e-scooters to see a clear example.

The answer is that venture capital has been paying your tab for many years. They have done it so the companies they invest in become indispensable in your life. To become the market leader that survives and thrives. But not all e-scooters or delivery solutions will survive. Companies will withdraw from markets, go bankrupt or merge as risk-willing capital dries up. This is only the beginning.

The companies that do survive, however, will dictate terms and prices. And it will get more expensive. Instabox and Budbee are the first on the Swedish market to merge and make a combined push. But they will not be the last.

YouTube Is Practically Lawless When It Comes to Children

SvD Näringsliv

This analysis was first published in SvD Näringsliv, in Swedish, on September 14th, 2022. This piece was translated from Swedish by Claude. Some phrasing may differ from a human translation.

Platforms like YouTube earn billions from children using their service. But the big grey zones that arise are something neither influencers nor the platforms want to tackle.

“Today we’re launching YouTube Kids, the first Google product built from the ground up with the littlest ones in mind. The app makes it safer and easier for children to find videos on subjects they want to explore.”

That was the messaging back in 2015, when YouTube and its parent Google first created a dedicated app for children. Before that, children had to click around the video site like everyone else, potentially ending up in unsuitable corners of the internet.

There was only one problem — children didn’t have to use the app.

It was just as easy to keep watching the way they had before, except now YouTube had an alibi that the main site was only for adults. The age of the site’s viewers has always been unknown — even if you could make an educated guess about who was watching children’s cartoons for hours on end.

Five years later, YouTube was forced to rework its systems anyway. The US Federal Trade Commission, FTC, hit them with a $170 million fine and pushed through changes where videos made for children had to be treated differently in terms of user comments, and the precision of ads was reduced.

This caused profitability for children’s videos to drop sharply — in many cases by more than half.

If you wonder why video creators don’t want to be classified as making content for children, it is now crystal clear: you make less money. Here is a possible explanation for the actions of Pontus Rasmusson, the influencer SvD has investigated in podcasts and articles.

There is no doubt that Pontus Rasmusson is a children’s idol. But according to YouTube’s systems, he makes videos for adults.

Looking at their own rules, though, you end up in something close to a Catch-22 around Rasmusson — the references to sex make his videos inappropriate for children. At the same time, the audience for the content is obvious. And in that grey zone, nothing happens.

Beyond ad views, YouTubers also make money on the content itself, through what is euphemistically called “collaborations”. These are ads dressed up as regular content, handled directly between the company and the video creator. YouTube as a platform cannot regulate this.

But the fact that Pontus Rasmusson “collaborates” with toy company Moose Toys gives a clear indication of who both parties to the transaction believe his audience to be.

The question this raises is how parents are supposed to know what their children are watching. In a comment to SvD, YouTube says that they “give parents the ability to control which YouTube content their children can see, including the ability to allow only content from trusted partners” — provided you use the YouTube Kids app.

But, as noted, not all children do.

Not in 2015 when the app came out, and not in 2022 either. Why would they start? The video content for children is still on the main site too — and then some.

The possibility of controlling the video offering for your children — channel by channel — is also wholly unrealistic for the average parent. It would be like having to pre-listen to every song on Spotify before the children could hear it. Theoretically possible — sure. But in practice both impossible and undesirable for most.

All platforms that involve children have an interest in painting pictures of families sitting on the sofa watching educational videos together. It probably looks like that sometimes. But the most common scenario is that the children are sitting alone, choosing what to watch, far from parents’ gaze and attention. The solutions need to start from reality and how it actually works, rather than from a glamorised ideal society.

Companies like YouTube and Instagram tend to say these are hard problems to solve. The precision of content judgements is not always as good as one might wish. That’s true. But this is a problem that did not have to exist in the first place.

You don’t have to mix content for children and adults together. You can restrict access to videos with various kinds of age verification. But all the economic incentives go against doing that. It is more profitable to put the burden on every individual parent than to fix the problem you yourself helped create.

SvD’s investigation of YouTuber Pontus Rasmusson shows that it is still close to a lawless land for children online. And the economic incentives point to it staying that way.

He is one of Sweden’s biggest YouTubers — among children. But parents accuse him of tricking their fans out of money. And why does he mix the child-friendly clips with constant sex references? Alice Aveshagen and Henning Eklund portray the Pontus Rasmusson phenomenon. A documentary from SvD.

Polestar’s Losses Keep Growing — When Does the Money Run Out?

SvD Näringsliv

This analysis was first published in SvD Näringsliv, in Swedish, on September 4th, 2022. This piece was translated from Swedish by Claude. Some phrasing may differ from a human translation.

Polestar’s losses are ballooning, driven by expensive costs from its SPAC listing. The EV company has been squeezed, and the question now is how quickly its owners will have to step up with fresh capital.

An ordinary IPO is usually preceded by a long and cumbersome process. The company has to be prepared for a whole new set of requirements and rules, management has to be trained, and a new way of reporting financial information has to be put in place.

On top of that comes the sales pitch to the market. This is where you display historical metrics and show how the business has developed up to today — which indirectly says something about how the future might look.

With a so-called SPAC listing, you get to skip that last part. No history is required; you can go public entirely on the basis of future hopes instead.

That fits perfectly for companies that have no history to offer. It is also much faster to get to the stock market, which suits young and innovative companies that need capital quickly.

It is no accident, then, that so many EV companies have gone public via SPACs. Tesla’s enormous stock market success is enough to pull the whole category along as the car industry heads toward general electrification. Faraday Future, Canoo, Rivian, Fisker and Lordstown Motors are all examples of EV companies that have benefited from this trend and listed relatively recently.

And then there is Swedish Polestar, which just reported its quarterly numbers. The figures showed a doubling of revenue but also runaway losses. On just over a billion dollars in revenue the loss was $885 million. Of that, a full $372 million was costs directly attributable to the SPAC listing.

That is equivalent to roughly SEK 4 billion.

Speed to market has its price, to put it mildly.

The choice of a SPAC for EV companies as a category may be logical, but for Polestar specifically it raises a number of questions.

Polestar is not a straightforward startup in this context — it was a wholly owned subsidiary of Volvo Cars. Volvo Cars is in turn listed on Nasdaq Stockholm since October 2021. And to make it even more complicated, Volvo Cars is 82 percent owned by the Chinese company Zhejiang Geely Holding Group (which is also the main owner of listed Geely Automotive). Access to capital exists at many different levels, and this Russian doll of listings looks like a complex and expensive way to solve the problem.

To understand a plausible motive, you need to go back about a year in time, to when news of Polestar’s combination with SPAC vehicle Gores Guggenheim first emerged. Back then enthusiasm was flowing on the stock market and money was pouring in.

A lot can happen in twelve months. The speed at which they moved to catch these favourable market conditions — even with the SPAC method — simply wasn’t fast enough. The Nasdaq 100 index fell around 20 percent between Polestar’s announcement and its first day of trading. But they still needed the capital.

Now an entire generation of listed EV companies has one more thing in common — it looks like their money is running out. As early as May this year, Fisker, Canoo and Lordstown Motors all warned that they might not have enough cash to last a year. Their share prices have also fallen between 42 and 62 percent apiece — just since the start of the year.

Polestar’s market cap, for its part, has nearly halved since the SPAC merger. Analysts at Bernstein Research wrote in June that the company might have to ask its main owners for more money.

As recently as Thursday, Polestar’s CFO Johan Malmqvist said in an interview with Bloomberg that “we are very excited about our upcoming launch”. The new SUV, Polestar 3, is released in October. But looking at the numbers, it will probably take more than additional car models to turn things around. It will take money.

If even Linkedin can’t function in China, who can?

The Daily

This column was first published in SvD Näringsliv, in Swedish, on October 15th, 2021.

There was only one realistic way into China as a foreign company. Now even that seems to be closed. When Linkedin dismantles its social network in the country, it could mark a new era for tech companies in China.

An established truth is that the only way to enter China as a foreign company is through partnerships. The local legislation and relations with the Chinese state simply require some form of Chinese ownership. But if you play those cards right, a huge market can open up.

It was the same story for Linkedin, when they launched in China in 2014. The Microsoft-owned social network partnered with venture capital firms China Broadband Capital and a Chinese branch of Sequoia Capital for exactly this reason. It is therefore noteworthy that Linkedin now announces that they are shutting down the part of the business where you can post articles and updates to each other. It seems that relations with the state were not sufficient to allow this activity to continue.

At the beginning of the month there were reports that Linkedin had started to remove content from journalists covering China. A reporter at the news site Axios received a message from Linkedin stating that “your profile and public activity, such as your comments and links you share with your network, will not be visible in China.” It was not specified which material was intended, but a common theme was that the message was sent to journalists who covered China, and who were thereby able to be critical of the country.

The thesis that it is about the expression of uncomfortable opinions is supported by the fact that Linkedin still retains some business in the country, but that it is through a newly started app that provides job ads. The company as such is therefore not banned from the country – it is only a certain part of the business that can no longer be carried on. The company itself specifies that it has become a “significantly more challenging environment and greater requirements for regulatory compliance in China”.

Linkedin is not alone in experiencing this “challenging environment”. In one fell swoop, the entire Chinese tutoring industry was shut down after the government deemed it unsuitable for profit. This week that industry received some redress, when those companies are now allowed to assist with vocational training at least. That fits well with the modern China that Xi Jinping wants to build. And those types of swings can happen quickly – even for the companies that are on the inside.

The picture being painted is of a China that is closing itself more and more. The harsh pressure that has been put on the domestic tech companies has attracted the world’s eyes and caused stock market prices to fall. When established foreign companies – which followed market practices – are forced to reconsider their operations, this could create more uncertainty among the world’s investors.

If even the world’s second highest valued tech company, Microsoft, can’t manage to navigate the political landscape – what will all other companies do?

This column was first published in SvD Näringsliv, in Swedish, on October 15th, 2021.

New phenomenon turns players into investors

The Daily

This column was first published in SvD Näringsliv, in Swedish, on October 11th, 2021.

When I started, I played almost four to five hours a day, says John Ramos, a 22-year-old man from the Philippines.

It sounds like a quote you’ve heard many times before from someone caught up in a gaming addiction. But this is something else, and it ends in a different way than they usually do.

Ramos has made gaming into a job. He has recently bought several homes with the winnings he has accumulated in the game “Axie Infinity” since he started last November. It is part of a new phenomenon in the gaming and crypto world called “play to earn”.

Behind the game is the Vietnamese game studio Sky Mavis, which was recently valued at $3 billion when the American venture capital giant Andreessen Horowitz invested in them. It is a company that has only existed for three years. Development has been rapid – and continues to do so. Revenue from purchases inside Axie Infinity is projected to reach $1 billion by 2021, with 17 percent of that going to Sky Mavis.

The trend is in an early phase, but can also be found in Sweden. The game developer Antler Interactive is developing a game called “My Neighbor Alice” together with the blockchain company Chromaway. It uses its own cryptocurrency Alice, which was publicly launched in March this year. While the trading of Alice is already underway, the actual game itself is not finished yet. It is expected to be released sometime next spring.

Making money playing computer games is nothing new in itself. But “play to earn” still differs from e-sports and game streaming to the extent that it is the game itself that generates the revenue – not the viewers and sponsors around. E-sports is rather similar to regular sports in its business model. You play to collect virtual objects and cryptocurrency within the game itself, and it can then be traded on crypto exchanges outside.

It may sound like a small difference in the grand scheme of things, but it turns the traditional business models of the gaming world upside down.

Normally, the revenue for a game goes directly to the gaming company that developed it. Sometimes the money is shared with game publishers who helped develop and market the game. Somewhat simplified, you can say that the more people play, the more profitable the game becomes – regardless of the underlying business model.

With “play to earn” you also play games, but the difference is that the more people participate, the more valuable what you own in the game becomes. You as a player thus profit from the success of the game by the fact that the assets you have acquired in the game get more potential buyers. The most expensive Axie – a cartoon animal that looks like a mix of a cat and a fish – was sold at the end of last year for about 125,000 dollars.

The more people playing, the more people can participate in the trade. Seen from this perspective, it is more like a cryptocurrency or a common stock, where the value is governed by supply and demand. If you then drape this trade in a game, you get a hybrid where players have clear incentives to spread the game on to others. You don’t spread the game necessarily because it’s so much fun – but because you can profit from it yourself.

This development is interesting and fast-growing, but it also brings with it an aftertaste of industries that one might not want to associate with. Recruiting new players to make one’s own investment more valuable is similar to MLM (multi-level marketing, i.e. sales where individuals sell directly to other individuals) and also has some similarities to pyramid schemes.

When you start playing computer games to earn money, many new questions appear. Is this entertainment or an investment business? Is it perhaps more like a casino than a board game? In an almost lawless land between gaming and cryptocurrencies, we’ve only seen the start of this trend – and its problems.

This column was first published in SvD Näringsliv, in Swedish, on October 11th, 2021.

The Number That Should Worry Klarna’s CEO Most

SvD Näringsliv

This analysis was first published in SvD Näringsliv, in Swedish, on August 31st, 2022. This piece was translated from Swedish by Claude. Some phrasing may differ from a human translation.

Klarna will shrink its loan amounts to bring down credit losses. But while the company’s focus has been on the US, the Swedish business is now shrinking for the first time.

It is every CEO’s job to present and package reality as positively as possible. Sebastian Siemiatkowski, CEO and co-founder of Klarna, knows this very well. Which comes through clearly when you read the company’s interim report for the first half of the year, and his letter to shareholders in particular.

The more complex picture — the one Klarna does not communicate — is not quite so rosy. The company is losing around SEK 35 million a day. Cash flow is negative SEK 9.8 billion, of which just under a third is acquisition-related, compared with positive SEK 1.5 billion in the same period last year. And while the American market is growing fast — but expensively — revenue from Sweden is actually falling by 9.5 percent. That is the first time it has happened.

The fact that the Swedish market is shrinking is notable.

Klarna has been the clear market leader in Sweden for many years, but has faced increasing competition from similar products and offerings. That the company’s focus has been on the US has been obvious — revenue there is growing by more than 100 percent — but now, for the first time, there are signs that this may have come at the expense of more established markets. The fact that Swedish e-commerce has declined overall after a pandemic-fuelled boom probably plays a role as well. Finally, a change in the company’s product mix, where a sort of “perpetual credit” has been scrapped, also contributes.

Even Germany, Klarna’s single largest market, grew by just over 6 percent in the period. Klarna is the country’s second-largest payment system after PayPal, but a long line of challengers is appearing on the horizon there too. And this summer came the news that even the big bank Deutsche Bank is entering the hot “buy now, pay later” market in the country. Competition is intensifying.

Turning the business back to profitability requires both that established markets keep working, and that the US expansion stops bleeding money. Klarna writes in the report that they have changed their approach to credit losses and that they will lend smaller amounts to reduce that outflow. It remains to be seen what effects this will have, but between the lines you can at least sense some seriousness about the enormous losses the company continues to have.

Looking ahead, the challenge is exactly this balancing act between maintaining established, mature markets and growing into new ones at the same time. Siemiatkowski writes that the credit losses have been a “conscious consequence” of the company’s growth rate. It is true that growth has been rewarded by investors — almost at any cost — for many years. But it is, to put it mildly, optimistic to believe that changing their lending would not affect existing and future customers in ways beyond just credit losses.

The company has large and established competitors in the US as well, including Affirm and Afterpay (part of Block). Klarna’s success and growth rate there is tied to its competitiveness, something that can be diluted by changes of this kind.

The optimism from Klarna’s chief is familiar. In an interview with Dagens industri in May this year, Siemiatkowski said that “I am optimistic and I think there are good conditions” to defend the company valuation of around $45.6 billion that Klarna had previously received from investment company SoftBank. Less than two months later they raised new money at a valuation around 85 percent lower.

A positive outlook is a good starting point for a CEO. But that alone will not pull Klarna out of the tough market situation it finds itself in. Retooling a giant operation like Klarna can take longer than you think. Because the money is running through the company and the conditions for attracting new investors on favourable terms are harder than they have been in many years.

SoftBank and Masayoshi Son Face the Fight of Their Lives

SvD Näringsliv

This analysis was first published in SvD Näringsliv, in Swedish, on August 30th, 2022. This piece was translated from Swedish by Claude. Some phrasing may differ from a human translation.

They lost billions in the scandal-ridden WeWork, handed Klarna a record valuation and allowed Uber to steamroll its competitors. Now Japanese SoftBank and its CEO Masa are fighting the match of their lives. Can they survive the tech chill?

Dressed in a black suit and black turtleneck, Masayoshi Son, CEO of SoftBank Group, steps onto a stage in Tokyo in May 2021. He looks pleased. With good reason, you might say. He is about to present the best result in Japanese corporate history.

The presentation begins with a black-and-white photo from 1981. It shows Fukuoka in southern Japan — the city where the story of Masayoshi Son, usually called Masa, and the company SoftBank begins. Masa tells the audience how he once told his first two employees that one day they would count the company’s value in the trillions of yen.

That day came and went long ago. And now he is about to blow past that milestone as Masa announces that SoftBank has made a profit of 4,900 billion yen — around SEK 380 billion at today’s exchange rate. To put that in perspective, it is roughly twice what Toyota made in profit during the same period.

A year earlier the situation was radically different, with a loss of 800 billion yen, SEK 62 billion. The result stands out on the chart of the company’s 40-year financial history that Masa layers over the photo of his hometown.

Masa concedes that, depending on how the stock market develops, the company may see “a few peaks and valleys”.

That would turn out to be the understatement of the year.

A year later, in May 2022, Masa steps onto the stage again. This time he is sombre. Masa has to explain how that record profit has now flipped — again — into a record loss. Covid-19, inflation and the tech chill on the stock market have made for a tough year for the Japanese conglomerate. The bottom line ends at minus 1,700 billion yen, about SEK 132 billion. In a single year.

“We are now going into defence mode,” Masa says, a little grimly.

The big question everyone is asking is whether SoftBank can turn this around and climb back to the same heights — or whether Masa will be remembered as the tech boom’s loudest cheerleader.

Even early in his career, Masa had an eye for good but risky investments. SoftBank started as a software distributor and quickly added both computer magazines and events to its offering. Interest in computers exploded during the late 1980s and SoftBank became Japan’s largest events company in computers and technology.

In 1994 Masa took SoftBank public at a valuation of $3 billion. That allowed him to start investing in internet companies. One of them was called Yahoo, and the partnership evolved into a joint company the following year — Yahoo Japan. The site went on to become enormously dominant in the country over the coming years, just like its American counterpart on the other side of the Pacific.

With the success of Yahoo Japan behind him, Masa could crank up his risk appetite further. In 2000 he invested $20 million in a young Chinese entrepreneur named Jack Ma and his company Alibaba. Today the company is one of our era’s largest and most important tech giants — and 20 years after Masa got in, the investment’s value has grown to more than $150 billion. Very likely one of the single best investments in history.

Masa’s eye for talented entrepreneurs also led him to another man who used to wear a black turtleneck on stage — Steve Jobs, then CEO of Apple.

In an interview with TV journalist Charlie Rose, he described his reasoning:

“If I’m going to get into the mobile operator market, I need a weapon. And who can create the world’s best weapon? There is only one person — Steve Jobs.”

This was 2005, two years before the iPhone was released, and Apple had enjoyed great success with the iPod music player. The company had never publicly mentioned a phone. Masa, however, had his own idea of how it might go:

“I called up Steve Jobs and went over to see him. I brought my little sketch of an iPod with phone functionality and gave it to him. He said, ‘Masa, don’t give me your sketch. I have my own.'”

Masa saw the potential years before the iPhone even existed. And he tried to get Jobs to give him exclusivity in Japan on this prospective phone — whenever it might be released. Jobs said he couldn’t do that, mainly for one very obvious reason: SoftBank was not a mobile operator.

But that was a problem Masa could solve. The following year SoftBank acquired Vodafone’s Japanese operator business, and in 2008 they got exclusive rights to the iPhone in Japan. The rest is history.

Having a long time horizon is a recurring theme throughout SoftBank’s history. And while ordinary companies tend to struggle to even figure out where the business should go more than five years out, Masa is aiming centuries ahead. In 2010 he speculated about what SoftBank would look like 300 years from now, and he regularly gives presentations in which he lays out his view of the coming 30 years.

But vision without execution doesn’t create much shareholder value. To capitalise on his visions Masa needed money. A lot more money, in fact. And to fill the coffers he had to go far outside the public markets to cover his needs. This was where both the risks, and the world’s attention, really started to accelerate.

In 2017 SoftBank Vision Fund was born — a standalone venture capital vehicle sitting under the SoftBank Group umbrella. The fund raised $100 billion, of which SoftBank itself put in $28 billion. The rest of the money came from more controversial places, as the majority came from sovereign funds in Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. Two years later the fund raised another $100 billion-plus.

Vision Fund quickly made a name for itself by investing enormous sums at very high valuations. And given the fund’s size, they could do it in many companies at once, within a short period and all over the world. The portfolio companies are well known and include TikTok’s parent ByteDance, transport company Uber, crypto platform FTX and office hotelier WeWork. In Sweden, Vision Fund led Klarna’s 2021 funding round that valued the fintech at $45.6 billion, more than 400 percent higher than their round the year before. That was the valuation that then had to be cut by around 85 percent when Klarna needed to refill the coffers earlier this summer.

This is where SoftBank starts to become a liability rather than an asset for the companies they invest in.

In a boom where everything points upwards, SoftBank’s money was a fast way to accelerate growth. You could buy market share and outspend your competitors.

But when sentiment in the market turns — as it clearly did in the tech world earlier this year — the high valuations can go from a trophy to a heavy yoke. Staff options are usually tied to the company’s valuation, so having to cut it can have big consequences for your employees. But finding investors willing to top — or even match — where SoftBank and Vision Fund have come in is not easy. And then big drops in value can suddenly appear. That was the trap Klarna fell into — and they are far from alone.

So Masa stands on the stage again, in August this year. He is under pressure once more. Vision Fund has just posted a record loss of $23.4 billion, about SEK 246 billion — in a single quarter. When Vision Fund’s many companies went public, SoftBank’s value surged, but when tech stocks crashed it fell just as quickly. Masa is now promising cutbacks to restore the market’s confidence.

There is much to suggest he can turn the company around again. SoftBank has been through many transformations in its roughly 40 years. From events company to mobile operator to one of the world’s leading tech investors. More transformations are probably still to come.

But he cannot do it alone. Because although Masa’s timing has been remarkable, the question is whether his enthusiasm is enough to charm new investors in a tech world where the air has gone out of the balloon and most people are planning for months rather than years.

Not everyone, as we know, is working on the same 300-year horizon as Masa.